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COMMENTS
THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO A
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD
"Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change."1
There is no more fascinating subject in the field of federal constitutional
law than the relationship between due process and equal protection, concepts
brought together in the fourteenth amendment.2 Governmental action that
is fundamentally unfair and a denial of due process may also involve discrim-
inatory treatment and a denial of equal protection.' Accordingly, in a number
of cases the distinction between the two concepts has been blurred. In Douglas
v. California,4 the Supreme Court held that on first appeal counsel must be
furnished to indigents at state expense because the failure to provide profes-
sional representation is both fundamentally unfair and an invidious discrimina-
tion on the basis of wealth. Similarly, Griflin v. Illinois5 held that when the
"adequate and effective" review of a criminal conviction depends upon the
availability of a written trial record, an indigent is entitled to a free transcript.
These two cases, taken together, state what has been called the Griffin-Douglas
equality principle,6 which is based upon a blend of due process and equal pro-
tection considerations.
Importantly, the equality principle does not guarantee indigents the same
treatment afforded affluent defendants.' The indigent who desires to appeal
a criminal conviction is not entitled to demand the services of the most suc-
cessful attorney in the district. He has a right to be represented by a member
of the bar, but only if the court-appointed attorney is so incompetent that his
assistance is ineffective can the indigent defendant object. Nor is the indigent
automatically entitled to a free verbatim transcript of the trial or other proceed-
ing that he desires to challenge. Thus, paupers need not be afforded the same
review offered to affluent defendants; it is only necessary that they be given
equivalent and fundamentally fair treatment.' The Court has consistently
'Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
669 (1966).
"[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, 1.
8 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
'372 U.S. 353 (1963).
a351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. R. LAFAVE & J. H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 84 (3d ed. 1969).
' Comment, Griffin v. Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective" Appellate Review, 55 MICH. L.
REV. 413, 418 (1957).
' Professor Kamisar has written: "The root idea of the Griffin and Douglas cases may not be that
every inequality of any consequence in the criminal process is taboo, but only that due process incorporates
a basic notion of equality. It may be that the Griffin-Douglas principle does not come into play unless
and until 'discriminations' based on wealth work an inequality so significant in the criminal process as
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held that "adequate and effective" review does not always require a verbatim
transcript and that an indigent need only be furnished a record that will allow
him access to the courts.' The notion that, within the meaning of the equal
protection clause, an indigent may be afforded treatment with regard to
transcripts which is equal though not identical to that afforded nonindigents
is at the core of Griffin and its progeny. That proposition, it will be seen, is
open to criticism.
This comment begins with the Supreme Court's most recent decision in
point and traces the line of "transcript cases" from Griffin to the present, focus-
ing upon the question whether these cases actually satisfy the demands of both
due process and equal protection. The conclusion reached is that the poor still
suffer from discriminatory treatment. In order to satisfy the equal protection
clause, the Court should require the production of free verbatim transcripts
without a showing of need in all cases where an indigent seeks to challenge
his criminal conviction."
I. THE LATEST STATEMENT
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the duty to furnish
transcripts to indigents is Mayer v. City of Chicago." The defendant was
convicted of disorderly conduct and interference with a police officer and,
pursuant to Illinois law,'2 a verbatim record of his jury trial was kept. The
maximum penalty for each offense was a $500 fine, but the defendant was
sentenced to pay only $250 for each of his two convictions. Mayer, desiring to
exercise his right of appeal guaranteed by the Illinois constitution," alleged
to amount to 'fundamental unfairness.'" Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota, 48
MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1963). If that interpretation is correct, it is unclear why the equal protection clause
was mentioned at all. The cases can stand solely upon the due process ground as Mr. Justice Harlan
suggested. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The
Court's rejection of that view and its reliance upon equal protection theory indicate that something more
than fairness alone is required.
'There have been moments of wavering. See e.g., Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192
(1966); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971)
(dictum). These cases are discussed infra as lending support to the view that a new rule regarding
transcripts should be adopted.
1° If such a rule were adopted it would almost certainly affect the indigent's right to counsel.
Douglas concerned only first appeal cases and as yet no general constitutional right to counsel has been
recognized in discretionary appeals or in collateral proceedings. See Kamisar & Choper, supra, n.8.
Counsel may be furnished in such proceedings by statute. E.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1915 (1970); Doherty v.
United States, 404 U.S. 28 (1971). The Supreme Court has recently, however, shown a willingness to
extend the constitutional right to counsel. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972). Further
extensions on due process and equal protection grounds may be expected. For example, the issue of an
indigent's right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing was not reached in Morrissey v. Brewer, 92
S.Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972), but the Court clearly left that door open. 92 S.Ct. at 2605 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
In practical experience the distinction between indigent and nonindigent defendants is, of course, not
always clear. The discussion here assumes that, if a defendant is determined not to be an indigent, he
will be financially able to purchase a transcript. No attempt is made to deal with the marginal case
where the defendant can afford to pay for his own defense but must stretch his meager resources in order
to do so. For a general discussion in point, see OAKS & LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
THE INDIGENT: A STUDY OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY 150-51 (1968).
U 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
'ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, SS 651 t seq. (1969).
'ILL. CONST. art. 6, S§ 5, 7 (1870).
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indigency and petitioned the trial court for a transcript prepared at state
expense. He contended that he needed a full record of the events at trial to
support his assigned errors involving prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient
evidence. Alternatives to a transcript, such as an agreed statement of facts,
were inadequate though available in Illinois. 4 The trial court found Mayer
to be indigent but denied his request. The court cited an Illinois statute which
made verbatim transcripts available only in felony cases.' 5 Mayer then moved
the Illinois Supreme Court to order the production of a free transcript. The
motion was denied, and Mayer sought review in the Supreme Court of the
United States' 6 which reversed, holding that the refusal to supply the requested
transcript violated the defendant's rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan reaffirmed the holdings of
prior cases: A state must provide an indigent with a trial transcript or at
least with a record of sufficient completeness to allow him to obtain adequate
appellate review of his conviction. Alternatives, such as those provided in
Illinois, are sufficient only if effective review does not require a verbatim
record. When the appellant shows a colorable need for the full record, the
state has the burden to show that only a part of the transcript or some substi-
tute would be adequate. The Court then held that the Illinois rule allowing
free transcripts only in felony cases made an "unreasoned distinction"" in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. It was considered irrelevant that the
defendant neither was, nor could have been, subject to imprisonment for the
nonfelony offenses charged.
The significance of Mayer lies more in what the Supreme Court failed to
do than in the little new ground which was broken. States that provide a
right of appellate review in criminal cases had since 1956 been required to fur-
nish indigent defendants some form of trial record.' 8 It had previously been
recognized that whenever a colorable need for a full verbatim transcript is
shown, the government bears the burden of proving otherwise.' 9 And it was
predictable on the basis of earlier cases that the Court would reject any rule
that based the right to a transcript on the distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors or that denied that right in cases where the defendant is not
exposed to imprisonment." Importantly, however, the Court failed to take
advantage of the opportunity this case presented to go further by requiring
the production of free verbatim transcripts without a showing of even color-
able need whenever an indigent seeks to challenge his criminal conviction."
'
4
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110A, S 323(c) and (d) (1969).
'ILL. REV. STAT., ch. IlOA, S 607(b) (1969).
'8 Cert. granted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
'See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S.
214, 215 (1958).
°Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459 (1969).
'In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971), decided with Mayer, the Court expressed
doubt as to the constitutional validity of requiring an indigent to make a showing of need before the
1972]
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An analysis of prior cases is essential to an understanding of the issues pre-
sented but left unresolved in Mayer.
II. DIRECr APPEALS IN STATE CASES
Beginning with the landmark decision in Griffin v. Illinois,22 the United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that "destitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts."2 Griffin and Crenshaw had been tried together
and convicted of armed robbery. Then, as now, Illinois law provided a right
of direct appeal in criminal cases. 4 However, trial transcripts were supplied
free of charge to indigent defendants only in capital cases.25 Nevertheless,
Griffin and Crenshaw moved the trial court for a full verbatim transcript of
all proceedings. They argued that they were unable to pay for a transcript
and that they needed one for their appeal. In order to obtain review of as-
signed nonconstitutional trial errors, a bill of exceptions that contained the
portions of the transcript showing the alleged errors had to be filed with the
appellate court.26 Persons who could not afford transcripts were provided a
free "mandatory record" which included only the indictment, arraignment,
plea, verdict and sentence. For indigents, therefore, review was limited to
errors appearing on the face of the mandatory record; trial errors could not
be considered.27
The trial court denied the motion for transcript without a hearing. A
motion was then filed under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,"8
alleging that failure to provide the transcript violated the equal protection
transcript of a mistrial must be provided at state expense. A majority of the Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Marshall said: "We agree with the dissenters that there would be serious doubts about the
decision below if it rested on petitioner's failure to specify how the transcript might have been useful
to him. Our cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant of a transcript of prior proceed-
ings, without requiring a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case." The Court then
cited Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) and Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967)
as examples of cases in which the Court had "simply found it unnecessary to discuss the question."
The Court ruled that the Britt transcript had been properly denied because the mistrial had ended only
a month earlier. With the proceedings on mistrial fresh in counsel's mind and with the court reporter
available to read prior testimony, a transcript was deemed unnecessary to petitioner's defense.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissent joined by Mr. Justice Brennan who wrote the opinion in Mayer for
a unanimous Court, cited Roberts and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Hardy v. United States,
375 U.S. 277 (1964) in support of the view that a full transcript should have been provided without a
showing of need. Britt was distinguished and the transcript of a mistrial granted in People v. Glass,
197 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. App. 1972). But see State v. Kelley, 209 Kan. 699, 498 P.2d 87 (1972).
If a showing of need becomes unnecessary for indigents requesting transcripts, it is difficult to
imagine how substitutes for verbatim records will be constitutionally adequate. The sufficiency of a
substitute has always been judged according to the indigent's predicted needs in presenting his arguments.
If need is to be presumed, the conclusion which must be reached is that verbatim transcripts must
be furnished in all cases. These questions will be more fully explored infra.
'351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 19 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
' However, the federal constitution does not require the states to provide appellate review. McKane
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1893).
SILL. RaV. STAT., ch. 38, S 769(a) (1955).
'ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 259.70(a) (1953). Constitutional errors were reviewable in a separate
proceeding pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. Rav. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 826-32
(1955).
' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 n.2 (1956) (opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
'ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, S§ 826-32 (1955).
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and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. That motion was also
denied, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The case was reversed and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court, although a majority of the
Justices could not agree in any single opinion. Mr. Justice Black wrote the
main opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Clark concurred. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
provided the majority of five necessary to remand the case. Mr. Justice Burton,
Mr. Justice Minton, Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented together,
with Mr. Justice Harlan adding a separate dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Black concluded that the Illinois procedure violated both the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. How-
ever, it has been suggested that the due process considerations were more basic
to Justice Black's analysis.29 On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter apparently
considered the equal protection argument dominant."0 Justice Harlan, in a
cogent dissent, found the equal protection ground of the Black opinion "simply
an unarticulated conclusion" that the Illinois procedure violated that funda-
mental fairness traditionally required by due process." Therefore, he limited
his discussion of the merits to the due process considerations, and, finding no
arbitrary or capricious state action, dissented.
Justice Harlan's dissent is the most relevant of the Griffin opinions for
purposes of the present discussion because of his belief that the merits should
not have been reached. He pointed out that the record was unclear on at
least one major point. Did Griffin and Crenshaw contend they "needed" a
transcript because, under Illinois law, one must be filed with the appeal?
If not, did they contend that as a practical matter they could not adequately
prepare their case for appeal without a transcript? If the latter, Justice Harlan
would have required a showing of need based on more than indigence alone.32
Justice Black merely relied upon the concession by Illinois that "it is sometimes
impossible to prepare such bills of exceptions or reports [that must be filed
with the writ of error] without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceed-
ings."3 Justice Black assumed for purposes of the decision that the defendants
were denied appellate review of possible nonconstitutional errors solely because
they could not pay for a transcript.
Griffin clearly held that, if appellate review is made available to affluent
defendants, it must also be provided to indigents. In Illinois, where a bill
of exceptions must be filed with an appeal and where a transcript is necessary
to the preparation of such a bill, transcripts must be supplied without cost to
indigents. Justice Black, however, appears to have contradicted himself when
he stated that poor people must be afforded "as adequate appellate review"
2 Comment, Griffin v. Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective" Appellate Review, 55 MiCH.
L. R~v. 413, 417 (1957).
8D Id.
' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8'Id. at 32.
' Id. at 13-14 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
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as nonindigents,84 but did not hold "... that Illinois must purchase a stenog-
rapher's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot afford to buy it.' ' "5
The Griffin case must stand for the proposition that the fourteenth amend-
ment requires a state to supply a trial record of some kind to indigent appel-
lants. Perhaps there is a continuum stretching from no record at all to a
verbatim transcript of all proceedings, with the minimum constitutional re-
quirement lying somewhere between the two extremes. The Illinois "man-
datory record" which allowed review of only the most obvious matters of
form, did not satisfy the minimum. According to Griffin, certain "bystanders'
bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting trial proceedings," 6 if avail-
able, may be found to be between the minimum as defined by Griffin and the
verbatim transcript extreme. The position of a reporting method on the
continuum is determined by its sufficiency to provide adequate appellate review.
But what is adequacy? Is an indigent's review adequate simply because he
has access to the appellate court, or must he be afforded an equal opportunity
to present the arguments available to him, as reflected in the trial record ? If
the latter is the case, can the indigent's review really be equal if he is denied
the identical tools with which to work, that is, if he is denied the verbatim
transcript his affluent cellmate can purchase? In Illinois at the time of Griffin
a full transcript was required to prepare the bill of exceptions demanded by
statute for appeal.3 7 Therefore, under the particular facts of the case, the
fourteenth amendment required that indigents be provided no less than a
verbatim transcript. Still, the Court's refusal to hold that verbatim transcripts
must always be supplied left a nagging question. In a state with no statutory
requirement that a bill of exceptions be filed, what would be considered in
determining whether an indigent had been afforded adequate review by some
alternative to a verbatim transcript? One possibility was that the indigent
defendant would first state his grounds for appeal. Then a record adequate
for review of those grounds would be required.
Cases subsequent to Griffin shed some light on this question. In Eskridge
v. Washington Prison Board,88 the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
8'/d. at 19.
"The case, then, lays down the proposition that indigents must be afforded as 'adequate and effective
appellate review' as other criminal defendants; it does not prescribe the same review procedure." Com-
ment, Griffin v. Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective" Appellate Review, 55 MICH. L. REv.
413, 418 (1957).
"'351 U.S. at 20 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black). At the time, two reasonable interpretations might
have been given this sentence. It could have meant only that some cases do not require a verbatim tran-
script but can be adequately reviewed with the use of some substitute. Alternatively, Justice Black might
have been hinting at a distinction to be drawn between serious and petty offenses. Convictions in serious
cases would require verbatim transcripts while convictions of petty offenses would not. Comment,
Griffin v, Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective" Appellate Review, 55 MICH. L. Ray. 413,
419 (1957). Subsequent cases have established that the former interpretation was correct. See Williams
v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969).
351 U.S. at 20 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
"In the course of oral argument counsel for Illinois stated: "There isn't any way that an Illinois
convicted person in a noncapital case can obtain a bill of exceptions without paying for it." 351 U.S.
at 14 n.4 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black). It was also admitted that no alternatives were then available
to indigents in Illinois.
as357 U.S. 214 (1958).
[Vol. 20
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held Washington's procedure for indigent appeals unconstitutional. " State
law expressly required a transcript to be filed with an appeal, but a free tran-
script could be provided only if the trial court found that the appeal would
promote justice. Though the appellant alleged that "substantial errors" had
occurred at his trial, he had, in the opinion of the trial judge, received a trial
free of prejudicial error. On oral argument the Prison Board maintained that
the appellant might have used notes kept by someone other than the official
court reporter. However, the state courts had apparently assumed that a tran-
script was necessary, and the case was decided by the Supreme Court on that
basis. Following Eskridge, the Supreme Court of Washington fashioned a
new set of rules governing transcripts prepared at state expense.4" In his re-
quest for a free transcript, an indigent defendant was required by these rules
to state the errors that he believed had been committed. The state could then
show that a portion of the transcript, or some alternative such as a narrative
statement, would permit adequate review. After any necessary hearing, the
trial judge was to make findings of fact as to the defendant's indigency and
the type of record needed for appeal. If he found that an alternative to a
verbatim transcript would be adequate, his order could be limited to compelling
the state to provide that alternative. Importantly, if he found the defendant's
arguments frivolous, he could decline to require a transcript of any kind so
long as he supplied the appellate court with a statement of reasons for his
action.41
In Draper v. Washington,4' 2 the new Washington procedure came up for
review. There the trial judge found the defendants' allegations of error to be
frivolous and denied their motions for a free transcript. His order made find-
ings of fact and stated his reasons for finding the defendants' arguments
frivolous. However, it contained no portion of the verbatim transcript nor
any narrative statement of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Washington,
on the basis of the trial court's order alone, quashed the defendants' writ of
certiorari. In a five to four decision,4" the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. The trial court's order and prosecutor's affidavit were treated as an
attempt to provide a narrative statement as a substitute for a verbatim tran-
script. Speaking for the majority Mr. Justice Goldberg found that the order
was not a "record of sufficient completeness" '44 to permit adequate appellate
' The facts of the case showed that the petitioner in Eskridge had been denied a requested transcript
in 1935, twenty years before Griflin was decided. The Supreme Court's action made clear that Griffin
would be applied retrospectively. Mr. Justice Whittaker joined Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent on the
ground that Griffin should not apply to the earlier conviction.
'Two weeks after deciding Eskridge, the Supreme Court remanded another case, Woods v. Rhay,
357 U.S. 575 (1958), to the Washington Supreme Court for reconsideration. In a new opinion, Woods
v. Rhay, 54 Wash. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 332 (1959), new rules governing the availability of free transcripts
were promulgated.
Woods v. Rhay, 54 Wash. 2d 36, 44-45, 338 P.2d 332, 337 (1959).
"372 U.S. 487 (1963).
"The dissenters were Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Stewart. They believed the trial court's order to be adequate.
"This language was taken from Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), a case involving
federal appeals in forma pauperis.
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review. Moreover, the fact recitals in the prosecutor's affidavit were in "the
most summary form, were prepared by an advocate seeking denial of a motion
for a free transcript, and were contested by petitioners and their counsel at
the hearing on the motion."4
Like Griffin and Eskridge, the Draper decision did not require a verbatim
record in all cases. Justice Goldberg suggested no fewer than four alternatives
which would suffice4" if they provided an adequate record for review. The
Supreme Court clearly contemplated that an indigent appellant must first
state his arguments before a decision on the type of record required is made.
An indigent is entitled to "means of presenting his contentions to the appellate
court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with
similar contentions."47  The Court rejected the contention that an indigent
has an aboslute constitutional right to a verbatim transcript to aid him in
preparing his arguments on appeal. An indigent is not entitled to a transcript
in order to search it for error. Instead, he must first allege errors and then
be satisfied with a "record of sufficient completeness" to afford adequate review
of those errors.
The Court has not abandoned the Draper position, although it has con-
sistently held that financial requirements that impede an indigent's access to
appellate review violate due process and equal protection. Burns v. Ohio4"
held that a state may not, by requiring a docket fee, deny an indigent the
opportunity to invoke an appellate court's discretionary review. Nor may
counsel's exercise of discretion prevent review of an indigent's trial. The
Court so held in Anders v. California," where appointed counsel had declined
to prosecute an appeal he believed to be without merit. The Supreme Court,
in reversing, set down guidelines to be followed by state courts. Before with-
drawing from a case, appointed counsel must supply the defendant with a
brief of anything in the record supporting the contentions raised. The right
to a transcript of a preliminary hearing was sustained in Roberts v. LaVallee, °
in which the Court stated: "Our decisions for more than a decade now have
made clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate
'Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 497 (1963).
"They were: a statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a narrative statement based on the trial
court's minutes, a statement based on the reporter's untranscribed notes and a bystander's bill of exceptions.
47 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) (emphasis supplied).
360 U.S. 252 (1959), decided before Draper.
"386 U.S. 738 (1967).
-389 U.S. 40 (1967). In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that Roberts had not stated the
use to which he expected the hearing transcript to be put. Because the cases cited by the majority did
not declare an unconditional right to a transcript, Justice Harlan would have required a showing of need.
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The per curiam opinion in
the case was brief and did not mention any necessary showing of need. However, in view of other cases
decided prior to Roberts and since, it is clear that the Court did not intend to set a new standard, what-
ever the merits of such a course. See Morgan v. Graham, 497 P.2d 464 (Okla. Crim. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Britt .... Mass ...... 285 N.E.2d 780 (1972). Preliminary hearing transcripts are now available
in the federal system upon motion by indigent defendants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(2).
Kansas law provides for a preliminary hearing transcript to be prepared and furnished free to an
indigent defendant. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-2904 (Supp. 1971). But see State v. Serviora, 206 Kan. 29,
476 P.2d 236 (1970) on the question of an absolute right to such a transcript. See also State v. Kelley,
209 Kan. 699, 498 P.2d 87 (1972) interpreting S 22-2904 and relying on the trial court's determination
that a transcript was unnecessary. See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4509 (Supp. 1971).
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legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are
repugnant to the Constitution."'
There is a significant gap between this constitutional principle and the
rule that requires indigents to state their grounds for appeal before a tran-
script, limited to the proceedings involving those grounds, is provided. An
affluent defendant, not trusting his memory or that of counsel to recall each
instance of possible error in lengthy and complex legal proceedings, will al-
ways purchase a verbatim trial transcript to be gone over time and time again
to garner every error that might be argued on appeal. Nor will he limit his
search to the objections of record. Instead, he will comb the transcript for
errors possibly overlooked during trial in the hope of finding a basis for ap-
pellate relief. Various rules of appellate procedure allow errors to be considered
on appeal although no objection was raised at trial.5" Only then, after an ex-
haustive search of the record, will the affluent defendant prepare his appellate
brief. In contrast, the indigent is left at the outset to his own resources. From
his memory or notes of trial must come specific assignments of error. Even
if he is able to state his arguments well enough to obtain portions of the tran-
script, those parts of the verbatim record not concerned with his stated con-
tentions will continue to be denied. If there are errors in the omitted portions,
the appellate court will never review them.
To some extent, the Supreme Court came to grips with this problem in
Hardy v. United States,53 a case that dealt with the federal judicial system.
It was held that, in the federal courts, an attorney newly appointed on appeal
was entitled to a full verbatim transcript of prior proceedings. Otherwise,
counsel who did not represent an indigent defendant at trial could not dis-
charge his duty to bring to the appellate court's attention every error that
might support reversal. Under a federal statute,54 any appointed attorney was
entitled to those portions of the trial transcript relevant to assigned errors.
However, the Court held that, in the case of newly appointed counsel, a full
transcript was necessary to search out "plain errors or defects affecting sub-
stantial rights" which would be cognizable on appeal even though no objection
to them had been raised at trial.55 In order to give meaning to the federal
statutes and to Federal Rule 52(b), the Court reasoned that a verbatim tran-
script must be furnished an attorney who was not present at trial.
The majority opinion was narrow and couched in terms of the applicable
federal statutes. However, Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion
in which he urged that "in the interests of justice this Court should require,
under our supervisory power, that full transcripts be provided, without limita-
tion, in all federal cases to defendants who cannot afford to purchase them,
' Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967).
'E.g., FaD. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
"375 U.S. 277 (1964).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 753(f) (1970). See also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
DFa. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
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whenever they seek to prosecute an appeal."5 Describing the trial transcript
as a "basic and fundamental tool of the [legal] profession,"57 Justice Goldberg
argued that full transcripts must be provided even if the same attorney who
represented the indigent at trial is appointed on appeal. He examined the
much-feared costs of such a rule, but concluded that "a system of free tran-
scripts will, in the long run, be less expensive than the present system with
its multiple proceedings [involving requests for transcripts] and frequent
delays."" Three other Justices agreed that any financial burden created would
be outweighed by the elimination of the delays and other burdens now placed
upon indigent appellants."
The Supreme Court has not applied the Hardy rule, which was admittedly
limited to federal prosecutions, to the states." Although it is more clear in
some cases6 1 than in others, 2 the law apparently is that there is no unlimited
right to a verbatim trial transcript. By approving the use of alternatives other
than full transcripts the Court has implicitly required an indigent to compose
a list of possible trial errors before seeking a record of sufficient completeness
to allow review of those alleged errors.63 Mayer did not retreat from that
position. The Court there expressly held that a full verbatim record must be
provided only if the indigent's grounds for appeal show a colorable need for
a complete transcript and if the government is unable to show otherwise. 4
III. STATE COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS
The constitutional principle of Griffin has been extended to direct appeals
from collateral proceedings. 5 The extension first occurred in Smith v. Ben-
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
5
7 Id. at 288.
MId. at 292.
Id. at 292-93.
e Noting that Hawaii has a statute substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and a rule of procedure
similar to FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), the Hawaii Supreme Court has adopted the Hardy rule. See State
v. Pence, 488 P.2d 1177 (Haw. 1971).
E.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
62 See discussion of Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Roberts v. LaVallee, supra note 50.
The weakness of this logic was pointed out by Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Hardy.
As any effective appellate advocate will attest, the most basic and fundamental tool of his profession
is the complete trial transcript, through which his trained fingers may leaf and his trained eyes
may roam in search of an error, a lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge a change
in an established and hitherto accepted principle of law. Anything short of a complete transcript
is incompatible with effective appellate advocacy. . . . No responsible retained lawyer who rep-
resents a defendant at trial will rely exclusively on his memory (even as supplemented by trial
notes) in composing a list of possible trial errors which delimit his appeal. Nor should this be
required of an appointed lawyer.
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
' Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971). And, of course, the states are following this
rule. See e.g., Colbert v. Municipal Court .... Cal. App. 2d ., 101 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1972).
T The Court said in Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963):
The present case falls clearly within the area staked out by the Court's decisions in Griffin,
Burns, Smith, and Eskridge. To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal
from a criminal conviction, but Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle applies to state
collateral proceedings, and Burns leaves no doubt that the principle applies even though the state
has already provided one review on the merits.
Although there has been some discussion of a distinction between criminal and civil cases for purposes
of applying the "equality principle," it is now generally agreed that the rule developed in the Griffin-
Douglas criminal setting applies as well to collateral proceedings, even though they are civil in nature.
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nett," in which an indigent was precluded from petitioning for state habeas
corpus relief because he could not pay the statutory filing fee. While it did
not hold that the state must provide a postconviction remedy for convicted
prisoners,67 the Supreme Court did rule that any such remedy once made
available must not be administered so as to "interpose any financial considera-
tion between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right
to sue for his liberty."6 The decision was grounded upon a fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection rationale. In Lane v. Brown,6 9 a state prisoner had
petitioned a state trial court for a writ of coram nobis. After a hearing at which
the petitioner was represented by the public defender, the writ was denied.
The public defender believed that an appeal was useless and refused to order
a transcript of the hearing to be prepared at state expense.7" Because Indiana
Supreme Court rules provided that a transcript must be filed with an appeal,7'
the petitioner was precluded from appellate review. The United States Su-
preme Court reviewed the case on appeal from a denial of federal habeas corpus
relief. Because violation of the fourteenth amendment was found, the case
was remanded with an order to release the petitioner if he was not granted an
appeal on the merits of his coram nobis claim in the state courts of Indiana.
It was not clear whether Indiana was required to furnish Lane a free tran-
script; waiver of the requirement that a transcript be filed with an appeal
might have been sufficient in that Lane would have been afforded access to
the appellate court. In Long v. District Court of Iowa,72 however, it was held
that an indigent state habeas petitioner was entitled to a transcript of the
hearing on his petition in order to appeal a denial of the writ.7"
The Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether indigent state
prisoners must be provided free transcripts of their original trials for use in
collateral proceedings. That question was raised, but not reached, in Wade
v. Wilson.74 There the petitioner and a codefendant had been convicted of
murder in a California state court. Under applicable California law,7" the
two indigent prisoners were required to share a transcript of trial for use on
appeal. The codefendant received the transcript but refused to allow the peti-
tioner to see it. The petitioner's appointed counsel was able to borrow a dif-
ferent copy from the State Attorney General and an unsuccessful direct appeal
See Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971).
"365 U.S. 708 (1961).
'Though most states now provide such a remedy, the Supreme Court still has not made it mandatory.
See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964).
'Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961).
"372 U.S. 477 (1964).
'Without the public defender's order, Indiana would not furnish a transcript to an indigent
defendant.
"IND. SuP. CT. R. 2-40 (1958).
'385 U.S. 192 (1966).
"It was established that a full transcript of the hearing was available. Therefore, the Court did not
consider whether a substitute would suffice. Presumably, if Iowa had produced a narrative statement and
had shown why the petitioner needed no more, that would have been sufficient.
"396 U.S. 282 (1970).
'CALIF. R. CT. 35(c) and 10(c).
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was taken. Five years later the petitioner, desiring to attack his conviction
collaterally, again tried unsuccessfully to obtain the transcript from his code-
fendant. Since the borrowed copy had been returned to the Attorney General,
the petitioner applied to the trial court for a free transcript of his own. When
his request was denied by the state courts, the petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court.
The trial court ordered the prisoner freed unless he was provided a trial
transcript for use in the collateral proceeding. The unreported opinion was
based on a number of Supreme Court decisions including Griffin and Smith
v. Bennett." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the petitioner "was
not entitled to demand a transcript merely to enable him to comb the record
in the hope of discovering some flaw."77 The Supreme Court avoided the
issue by returning the case to the California courts for a determination of
whether the petitioner could once again borrow a transcript.7"
As a result, the Court failed to consider the clear analogy that could be
drawn between Wade and Gardner v. California," decided one year earlier.
In Gardner a California prisoner had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
in a state trial court. The writ was denied after a hearing. California did not
allow an unsuccessful habeas applicant to appeal directly but did permit a
new petition to be filed at the next appellate level.8" The second application
was not an appeal from denial of the first; it initiated a new proceeding. To
aid him in preparing the second petition, Gardner requested a free transcript
of the first hearing. That request was denied, partly on the ground that the
Griffin rule did not apply if no direct appeal was involved. The Supreme
Court reversed. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that
California law required that a statement of prior habeas corpus applications
be filed with any subsequent petition.8 ' Perhaps indicating his predisposition
toward a more liberal rule, Justice Douglas held that that requirement alone
created sufficient need for the requested transcript to make its denial to an
indigent a violation of the fourteenth amendment.8 2 California was ordered
-6365 U.S. 708 (1961).
'Wilson v. Wade, 390 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1968) citing McGarry v. Fogliani, 370 F.2d 42 (9th
Cir. 1967).
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said:
Petitioner argues that in any event, contrary to the Court of Appeals, the District Court was
correct in holding that because "it may not be possible to pinpoint . . . alleged errors in the
absence of a transcript," petitioner was entitled to a transcript for use in petitioning for habeas
corpus even though he did not specify what errors he claimed in his conviction. To pass on this
contention at this time would necessitate our decision whether there are circumstances in which
the Constitution requires that a State furnish an indigent state prisoner free of cost a trial transcript
to aid him to prepare a petition for collateral relief. This is a question of first impression which
need not be reached at this stage of the case. . . .We think consideration of that contention
should be postponed until it appears that petitioner cannot again borrow a copy from the state
authorities, or successfully apply to the California courts to direct his codefendant, Pollard, or
some other custodian of a copy to make a copy available to him.
Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 286 (1970).
"393 U.S. 367 (1969).
'See Loustalot v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 2d 905, 913, 186 P.2d 673, 677-78 (1947).
8 1
CALIF. PENAL CODE S 1475.
'The majority opinion in Gardner emphasized, perhaps more than in any case since Hardy, the
importance of a full transcript of record. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote both opinions, and it seems fair to
assume that his recognition of a transcript's value lead him to decide in Gardner that sufficient need
had been shown.
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to furnish the verbatim record of the hearing because it had not shown that
a portion of the transcript or some alternative would be an adequate substitute.
An analogy can be drawn between the factual situations in Gardner and
Wade. The transcript of the habeas corpus hearing in Gardner corresponds
to the trial transcript in Wade. Gardner wanted the hearing transcript in order
to prepare arguments for a new and entirely different proceeding, not for a
direct appeal. His second habeas corpus petition, attacking the trial court's
judgment denying his first, was the functional equivalent of Wade's collateral
motion challenging his original conviction. If Gardner was entitled to a
transcript of his first hearing, Wade should have been provided a transcript
of his trial. There is no persuasive reason for distinguishing the two situations.
Of course, collateral motions and petitions are limited generally to the alleged
violation of constitutional rights, while mere procedural errors may be re-
viewed on quasi-direct appeal as in Gardner. Still, errors which have consti-
tutional importance may occur at any stage, and particularly at trial as in
Wade. There is no reason to assume that a trial transcript will not reveal
violations of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the question was not reached
in Wade, and courts that have subsequently considered similar cases have de-
clined to articulate any general rule.' It does appear, however, that if a state
prisoner first shows that he has been denied a constitutional right which a
postconviction (collateral) remedy is designed to protect, the states may be
required to produce a transcript of the pertinent proceedings.8 4 Such a rule
is consistent with the Supreme Court's requirements in direct appeal cases.
IV. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
The availability of transcripts of state proceedings for use by indigents in
petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief is governed by statute 5 and by
the Supreme Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain. 6 That case held that a
federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing, to make its own find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, if the applicant did not receive a full and
'E.g., Harlow v. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 328 F. Supp. 296, 297 (W.D. Va. 1971).
In Briggs v. Missouri, 321 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1971) it was said that no transcript
need be supplied where it was not shown to be necessary "to the presentation or determination of
particularized issues." Prisoners' dissatisfaction with the current practice is illustrated in Carpenter v.
Oldham, 314 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1970) where the prisoner brought a federal civil tights action
for damages against a state judge who refused him a transcript. The Kansas Court has denied a trial
transcript to an indigent prisoner seeking to challenge his criminal conviction on motion to vacate
sentence pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964). Jackson v. State, 204 Kan. 823, 465 P.2d 927
(1970). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4506 (Supp. 1971) which now requires that trial transcripts be
furnished upon a showing of need.
" Harris v. Nebraska, 320 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D. Neb. 1970).
'28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1970): If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in
such State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made therein,
the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is
unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the
Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official.
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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fair hearing on the merits of his claim in a state court.s7 In order to determine
whether such a hearing was provided, the federal habeas court must of neces-
sity have access to the record of the state court proceeding. It was said in
Townsend that "[a] District Court sitting in habeas corpus clearly has the
power to compel production of the complete state-court record.""s The Court
emphasized the indispensability of the state-court record, which must include
a transcript of testimony (or some adequate substitute), the pleadings, court
opinions and other documents. If such a complete record is not provided, a
hearing de novo on the merits is required. 9 The effect of this rule is to allow,
even to require, the federal district courts to find state-court records inadequate
and to hold hearings even though the state records would satisfy the Draper
constitutional standard. °
Congress has only required the production of "that part of the [state-court]
record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such determination [of a fact contested by the federal habeas applicant]." 1
No statutory provision requires that free verbatim transcripts be supplied to
all state prisoners who petition the federal courts for habeas corpus relief. In
light of Townsend the statute must be read to require the states to produce
state-court records for examination by the federal district courts if ordered to
do so. But nothing in the statute or in Townsend requires either the states or
the United States to provide the prisoner himself with a transcript to aid him
in preparing a federal habeas petition. That is, there is no right to a transcript
for the purpose of combing it for error.
This has been the holding of a number of federal courts, even after the
Supreme Court's decisions in Wade and Gardner.2 The familiar rule requir-
"',We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the
following conditions: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is
a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed
at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing." Id. at 313.
'ld. at 318-19.
Special problems have arisen where the clerk has died, Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963);
where portions of the proceedings were not recorded, United States ex rel. Hunter v. Follette, 307 F.
Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); or where the reporter's notes were stolen, United States v. Robinson, 460
F.2d 1164, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972). If the federal habeas court has any doubts about the adequacy of
the state-court hearing, an evidentiary hearing will be held. Where a hearing is not mandatory it is
discretionary, so that a new hearing may be held even if a verbatim transcript of the state proceeding is
made available.
I It has been suggested, however, that federal courts should be satisfied with records meeting the
Draper standard. "Draper in effect tells the states they may constitutionally use certain transcript sub-
stitutes, and the states will undoubtedly rely upon this statement of the law. It would be incongruous,
therefore, for the habeas courts to impose some higher standard in deciding whether the transcript sub-
stitute is sufficiently reliable to make a hearing unnecessary." Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 926 (1966).
' 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e) (1970).
' 5The most recent case is Jones v. Superintendent, 460 F.2d 150, 153 (4th Cir. 1972) where the
court clearly stated the present rule as follows: "We hold the right to a transcript when needed to
collaterally attack a conviction does not depend upon a balancing of the expense and administrative in-
convenience to the state against the interest of a defendant in securing a trial free from constitutional
error. The right is absolute, irrespective of expense or inconvenience to the state. Conversely, if no need
is shown, there is no constitutional right to a transcript, regardless of how easily and inexpensively the
state could furnish it" (emphasis supplied). See also, Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002, 1006-07 (10th Cir.
1970); Grace v. Dillow, 296 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
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ing the indigent prisoner to state his arguments before requesting a transcript
to support those arguments has generally been followed. In Chavez v. Sigler"
the Eighth Circuit held that, when a state prisoner shows a reasonably com-
pelling need for a transcript to support substantive allegations, the state must
provide him with a transcript. The Tenth Circuit in Jackson v. Turner94 held
that "petitioners who seek a transcript or who seek appointed counsel must do
more than allege conclusory allegations."95 And in United States ex rel. Wil-
liams v. Zelker"6 the Second Circuit ordered New York to supply a partial
transcript where the petitioner had alleged perjury in certain testimony at trial.
V. ORIGINAL FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS
The constitutional basis for the Supreme Court's landmark decisions con-
cerning free transcripts for indigents has been the fourteenth amendment,
with both the due process and equal protection clauses being cited. The federal
government, however, is not bound by the literal language of those provisions.
Still, the fifth amendment, 7 federal statutes,"8 and "considerations beyond the
corners" of federal statutes99 have, in various instances, led the Court to impose
fourteenth amendment standards upon the federal government.
Section 1915(a) of Title 28, United States Code allows any court of the
United States to authorize "the commencement, prosecution or defense of any
suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without pre-
payment of fees and costs . . . ." An appeal, however, may not be taken in
forma pauperis if the district court judge certifies that the appellant is not
proceeding in good faith. In Coppedge v. United States"° the Court applied
an objective standard, saying, "We consider a defendant's good faith in this
type of case demonstrated when he seeks appellate review of any issue not
frivolous." Accordingly, it was held that leave to proceed in forma pauperis
must be granted unless the issues raised by the indigent are so frivolous that
the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent °' This test placed
the burden of showing issues to be frivolous on the government.
Under section 1915 and the Coppedge rule, federal prisoners who desire
to appeal their criminal convictions, contest their detention by a writ of habeas
corpus, or challenge their convictions by a motion to vacate sentence, without
prepayment of fees, must first assert nonfrivolous arguments. That much is
-3438 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Snyder v. Nebraska, 435 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1970) where
the same court had earlier hinted at a similar rule before directing the prisoner to request a transcript
from state courts before arguing a violation of the fourteenth amendment on federal habeas corpus.H442 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971).
'Id. at 1305.
90445 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1971).
'
7
See discussion in United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964).
28 U.S.C. §§ 753(f), 1915 and 2250 (1970).
SCoppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962). The Court no doubt felt that no more




'° See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 9 (a) and Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1956). Mr. Justice
Douglas has recently criticized the rule requiring indigent defendants to first satisfy the threshold require-




clear. The test for determining what is and what is not frivolous, however, is
liberal. Probability of success is not demanded so long as a rational argument
can be made on the indigent's behalf. Equal treatment of poor and affluent
persons has been emphasized in the federal courts; therefore, in all cases the
government has the burden of showing frivolity."°
If the indigent prisoner obtains leave to proceed in forma pauperis, another
statute assures that he will receive any necessary transcript of prior proceedings
without cost. Section 753 of Title 28, United States Code requires that a
verbatim record be kept of all criminal proceedings in open federal court.
Subsection (f) provides:
Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal proceedings to persons proceeding
under the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. 3006A), or in habeas corpus proceedings
to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by
the United States out of money appropriated for that purpose. Fees for transcripts
furnished in proceedings brought under section 2255 of this title to persons per-
mitted to sue or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by the United States out
of money appropriated for that purpose if the trial judge or circuit judge certifies
that the suit or appeal is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide
the issue presented by the suit or appeal.
In addition, section 2250 of the same title directs the clerk of any federal court
to furnish an indigent petitioner copies of any documents or records on file
in that court as may be required by the judge who is considering the petition
or appeal.
Appeal from a criminal conviction is a matter of right in the federal
system."° If an indigent defendant desires to exercise that right, counsel is
appointed and, "as a minimum," a transcript relevant to his assigned errors
is supplied at government expense."' Hardy v. United States. 5 held that a
full verbatim transcript must be provided to any new counsel who is appointed
on appeal." 6 There is also a federal right of appeal from a denial of habeas
corpus relief."' The statutory provisions referred to above establish the habeas
appellant's right to a free transcript of the relevant portions of his unsuccessful
habeas hearing.
Cases involving transcripts for use in preparing motions to vacate sentence
under section 2255108 present additional questions. Section 753(f) now covers
' Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in S 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D.
343, 347 (1967).
5'Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962).
' Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279 (1964).
o Id.
ImAs mentioned heretofore, four concurring members of the Court would have gone further and
required free verbatim transcripts to be furnished to all federal prisoners.
w,28 U.S.C. 1 2253 (1970).
1w 28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970). Enacted in 1948, S 2255 requires a federal prisoner to seek post-conviction
relief from his criminal conviction in the court which sentenced him. Because an inmate must apply
for a writ of habeas corpus in the jurisdiction where he is physically confined, federal prisoners had over-
burdened the district courts located near the federal penitentiaries while other district courts received
very few such applications. The Congress designed the motion procedure under S 2255 to establish a
more efficient division of labor. Now a federal prisoner can use the writ of habeas corpus only where
he challenges some condition of his incarceration. Such an application is properly addressed to the court
[Vol. 20
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the furnishing of transcripts in section 2255 proceedings, but this has not
always been the case. The sentence in section 753(f) that refers to section
2255 motions was added by amendment in 1965.1"' Prior to that time there
had been a division of opinion among the federal circuits as to whether the
courts had the power, under the sentence referring to habeas corpus petitions,
to order transcripts for section 2255 proceedings. In United States v. Stevens,"'
the Third Circuit gave section 753(f) a narrow and almost certainly incorrect
construction, holding that courts had no such power."' Because it had gen-
erally been agreed that the section 2255 motion is the statutory equivalent of
the writ of habeas corpus," 2 the Stevens approach was doomed from the outset.
Soon, in United States v. Glass".. and United States v. Shoat,"4 the Fourth
Circuit held that courts could require transcripts for section 2255 purposes.
The court in Glass rejected the view expressed in Stevens and held that a
federal prisoner could be furnished a transcript of his trial if he first stated a
proper ground for relief and if the transcript was indispensable to the presenta-
tion of his arguments. The court emphasized, however, that an indigent was
not entitled to a transcript at government expense "merely to comb the record
in the hope of discovering some flaw.""' Shortly after Glass, the Supreme
Court decided Hardy v. United States."' The strong language in that case
concerning the near necessity of a trial transcript prompted the Fourth Circuit
to reexamine Glass. In United States v. Shoat... the holding in Glass was
reaffirmed. Judge Haynsworth, speaking for the court, pointed out that Hardy
involved a direct appeal, while the petitioner in Shoat was seeking to chal-
lenge his conviction collaterally with a section 2255 motion. There was a dis-
tinction to be drawn because most trial errors which might be appealed are
not cognizable in a collateral proceeding. And Judge Haynsworth believed
that, accordingly, in most cases a defendant pursuing a direct appeal has a
sitting in the district of confinement. If he wishes to attack his conviction, however, he must move the
sentencing court to vacate sentence pursuant to S 2255. See Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1062 (1970).
0 Pua. L. 89-167, Sept. 2, 1965.
110224 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1955).
' The court construed S 753(f) as allowing a free transcript to be provided only on appeal from a
proceeding of which the transcript is a record. See Sokol, The Availability of Transcripts for Federal
Prisoners, 2 AMR. CRiM. L.Q. 63 (1964). See generally R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 215-21
(1969).
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
"317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963).
"'341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964).
'United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1963). Professor Ronald P. Sokol, Director of
the Appellate Legal Aid Project at the University of Virginia School of Law, argued for petitioner in
Glass and later in Shoal. His position in Glass was based in part on the proposition that, because § 2255
was the statutory equivalent of habeas corpus, transcripts for S 2255 proceedings were authorized by the
portion of S 753(f) referring to habeas corpus. It was unclear whether the court accepted this view
because its opinion seemed to rely on the constitutional ground. If the court had clearly held that the
statute itself empowered the courts to furnish transcripts to indigent § 2255 movants, the later amend-
ment of § 753(f) might have been unnecessary. For a fuller discussion of the Glass appeal see Sokol,
The Availability of Transcripts for Federal Prisoners, 2 AMER. CRIM. L.Q. 63 (1964).
375 U.S. 277 (1964). There it was held that newly appointed counsel on appeal in federal cases
was entitled to a full verbatim transcript of trial.
1 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964).
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greater need for a transcript.1 '8 Further, the usual grounds for collateral relief
concern events outside the courtroom that would not be reflected in the tran-
script. In any event, Judge Haynsworth felt that a defendant could remember
the events at trial well enough and did not need a transcript to refresh his
memory.
While Judge Haynsworth's distinction may have some factual validity, it
is unnecessary that cases be decided differently on that basis. Regardless of
whether the "usual" grounds for collateral relief involve events outside the
courtroom-and one may argue whether that is true-in any given case the
question must be whether a particular transcript contains a basis for relief.
Certainly mistakes at trial are not always limited to mere procedural errors;
constitutionally protected rights may be affected at any stage. The prisoner
in Shoal argued both constitutional and statutory [section 753(f)] grounds.
Nevertheless, the court again ruled that, before a free transcript of trial can be
furnished in a section 2255 proceeding, the indigent prisoner must show that
a transcript is needed to support his grounds for relief.
In 1965 Congress added to section 753(f) the sentence referring to section
2255 motions. Notably, the new provision, while clearly contemplating that
transcripts will be supplied in section 2255 as well as habeas corpus proceedings,
placed an additional requirement on prisoners in the former situation. The
government must pay for transcripts in section 2255 cases only when the
prisoner is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and the trial or circuit judge
certifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed.
No such requirement of affirmative certification is placed on direct appeals
or, more importantly, on habeas corpus petitions. What Congress intended
to accomplish by this distinction is unclear."' After Coppedge v. United
States,' anyone allowed to proceed in forma pauperis has presumably asserted
nonfrivolous grounds, and the Supreme Court has not yet held that any
federal prisoner, even on direct appeal, has an absolute right to a verbatim
transcript without a showing of colorable need. 2'
The certification requirement may only force the federal judge to state
affirmatively what he necessarily held by implication when leave to proceed
in forma pauperis was granted. If, however, the certification requirement is
more than a restatement of forma pauperis standards serious constitutional
u The grounds for collateral relief are described by the statute as follows: "A prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court established by act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
', Indeed, then Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote the Chairman of the Committee on
the Judiciary on May 27, 1965, to say: "The reason for this distinction is not apparent if the motion
remedy under section 2255 is to be a remedy commensurate with a writ of habeas corpus." 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs, 89th CONG., Ist SEss., pp. 2920-21. One writer has suggested that the com-
mittee gave little consideration to the distinction. Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in
§ 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 357 (1967).
" 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
'That is, unless new counsel who did not represent appellant at trial is appointed on appeal. See
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
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questions are raised. 2 The United States Constitution prohibits the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus except in the case of rebellion or invasion.
123
Though section 2255 by its terms makes habeas corpus unavailable to most
federal prisoners, it is not a suspension of the Great Writ because the motion
to vacate sentence provides an equivalent remedy. 12' However, if access to a
transcript is made more difficult in section 2255 proceedings than in habeas
cases, the argument might be made that section 2255 is not the equivalent of
habeas and the writ has, in effect, been suspended. Additionally, the added
requirements in section 2255 cases may be inconsistent with the due process
considerations of Griffin v. Illinois.25 and subsequent cases.
In practice transcripts are furnished at government expense to indigent
federal prisoners who assert nonfrivolous grounds for relief and show a need
for a transcript of record.' 6 Some courts, however, have held that a transcript
will not be furnished unless a motion under section 2255 is pending.2 7 The
rule places the indigent prisoner in a quandry. He knows that he has only
one opportunity to advance a particular contention. If his first motion fails
to allege sufficient facts, it will be denied and he will be barred from making
the same argument a second time. 8 Accordingly, he is hesitant to prepare
and file a motion based solely upon incomplete and imperfect memory; he
needs to review the trial transcript in order to support his allegations as best
he can. Moreover, in the course of his review he may discover constitutional
arguments which he did not recognize at the time of trial or has since for-
gotten.' The inmate is told, however, that any application for a transcript
before a section 2255 motion is pending will be denied. The circle is complete.
He must frame the arguments in his motion before he can be given access to
the transcript which he rightly believes is necessary to frame his arguments.
The rule that a section 2255 motion must be pending before a trial tran-
'In his dissent in Gardner, Mr. Justice Harlan compared this certification requirement with the
ability of California courts to obtain needed transcripts they would not make available to indigent state
habeas corpus applicants. The majority there held the California practice to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 373 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. Co~s-r., art. 1, S 9.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed
to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention." 28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970). See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
'-351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'Benthiem v. United States, 403 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1968); Lucas v. United States, 423 F.2d
683 (6th Cir. 1970); Skinner v. United States, 434 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1970). Different solutions to
the problem of the appropriate remedy when the government does not willingly supply an ordered
transcript have been found. In Poe v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1964) the court reporter
was required to produce the transcript without prepayment and to sue, if necessary, for reimbursement.
In Henderson v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1964), however, the court determined
that the only adequate remedy was the relief requested. The prisoner was ordered released from custody.
'Ketcherside v. United States, 317 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1963); Dorsey v. United States, 333 F.2d
1015 (6th Cir. 1964). This is also the rule followed by the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas. Letter to the writer from Judge George Templar of the Kansas District Court. February 29,
1972.19 28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
' The general rule has been that the indigent has no right to a transcript merely to "comb it for
error." United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1963). See discussion of the Glass case
supra and the criticism below.
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script can be furnished has created similar difficulties for inmate legal assistance
projects. Charged with the dual purpose of identifying meritorious arguments
and screening out frivolous claims, such programs are often unable to function
according to plan. Given the opportunity to examine a transcript, an attorney
or student may be able to form a judgment as to whether arguable points are
presented. If no such arguments can legitimately be raised, counsel can dis-
courage the inmate and focus his attention on more profitable pursuits such
as job training and early parole. The result is efficient use of the prisoner's
effort as well as the court's time. On the other hand, if a transcript is not
made available in the preparation stage, the attorney or student cannot fairly
evaluate the inmate's case. Lack of access to a transcript encourages suits based
upon unverified allegations. If counsel decides to assert claims on the mere
hope that they will be supported by the transcript once it is prepared, he comes
dangerously close to defeating his purpose of handling only those cases with
substantial merit. In many instances the transcript will not sustain the argu-
ments made, and the legal assistance project will have increased rather than
reduced the number of burdensome, frivolous collateral motions which now
clog many court calendars.3 °
Other courts have indicated that a transcript may be made available, on a
showing of need, before a motion to vacate sentence is filed.' 8' However,
according to the dictum in Glass that there is no right to a transcript solely
for the purpose of searching it for errors, a showing of need is still required.'
That is, although an affluent inmate may purchase his trial transcript and dis-
cover any postconviction arguments that may be based upon its contents, the
indigent is not constitutionally entitled to the same opportunity. He must first
raise the contentions he expects the transcript to support. The effect is to
require paupers to have better memories than wealthy inmates.
"° See Jacob & Sharma, justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correc-
tional Process, 18 KAN. L. REv. 493, 496-99 (1970).
"8' Hoover v. United States, 416 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1969). This is an ambiguous opinion that seems
to break with prior Sixth Circuit policy. See note 127, supra. The court indicated that a § 2255 motion
pending might not be necessary if a proper showing of need (for a transcript) were made. However, it
then attempted to distinguish Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969), partly on the ground that the
second habeas corpus petition there sufficed for appeal from denial of the first and, therefore, a suit was
pending. It should be added that Gardner is very difficult to distinguish from the 5 2255 cases. See
discussion of state collateral proceedings supra. Of course, Gardner did not declare an unconditional right
to a transcript although a verbatim record was ordered in that case. Mr. Justice Blackmun has expressed
his belief that federal courts may order transcripts furnished before granting leave to proceed in lorma
pauperis. Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in S 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43
F.R.D. 343, 358 (1967).
inHarless v. United States, 329 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1964); Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325
(10th Cir. 1965); Culbert v. United States, 325 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1964). The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has also had difficulty with this question. In Bentley v. United States, 431 F.2d 250 (6th Cir.
1970), the court expressly invited the Supreme Court to take the appeal from its decision denying a
transcript and to decide the "combing" question. The court said: "This, of course, still leaves to be
decided whether the federal constitution gives appellant the unqualified right (one which an affluent cell
mate could exercise by purchase) to a transcript at government expense for new counsel to search for
constitutional error in order to file a motion for postconviction relief. We find it impossible to deny that
at least theoretically an affirmative answer would serve the constitutional purpose of the equal protection
and due process clauses as they have been spelled out above." The court gave the resulting financial
burden as a reason for not adopting the more liberal rule for the Sixth Circuit. Certiorari was denied.




The foregoing discussion reveals the state of the law to be as follows: A
state need not establish a right of direct appeal from a criminal conviction.
However, if an opportunity to appeal is provided, the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment require that indigents be
afforded as adequate and effective appellate review as that available to non-
indigents. Appellants who cannot afford to purchase transcripts of trial must
be furnished free records of sufficient completeness to permit adequate review.
Verbatim transcripts need not be furnished in all cases, but if an indigent's
grounds for appeal show a colorable need for the full record, the state has the
burden of proving that a portion of the transcript or some substitute will
suffice. This rule contemplates that the indigent appellant will state his con-
tentions before a record, pertinent to a review of only those contentions, will be
provided at state expense. The same standards are applied when an indigent
state prisoner seeks to appeal from denial of a collateral challenge. The four-
teenth amendment entitles him to a transcript of the collateral proceeding that
is sufficiently complete to afford effective review. The Supreme Court has not
yet held that a state must furnish a trial transcript to an indigent prisoner
seeking for the first time to challenge his conviction collaterally. However,
an analogy drawn from another case supports the conclusion that a record of
sufficient completeness must be furnished.
The constitutional principles applied in state transcript cases are applicable
to the federal government as well. Additionally, there is federal statutory
authority for requiring sufficiently complete transcripts to be furnished in
direct appeals or collateral proceedings if the indigent prisoner asserts non-
frivolous grounds for relief. If counsel who did not represent the indigent
defendant at trial is appointed on appeal, he is entitled to a full verbatim
transcript of all prior proceedings. The federal courts have power to compel
the states to furnish state-court records of proceedings to be reviewed on
federal habeas corpus.
Thus it has been recognized that whenever a court undertakes to review
prior proceedings some sort of record must be made available. It would be
fundamentally unfair, and thus a violation of due process, to deny a pauper
the opportunity for effective review by refusing to provide him with such a
record. And, if the indigent is to have equal protection of the laws, he must
be afforded access to a record equivalent to that which his affluent cellmate
can purchase. It is this contrast, between the record purchased by the non-
indigent and that made available to the indigent, which poses the recurring
question of the transcript cases. The language of the cases cannot be squared
with reality. Under present law it is simply not true that the indigent is
afforded as adequate and as effective review as the nonindigent. The indigent
must first state his arguments (on appeal or in a collateral petition or motion).
He is then entitled to a record of sufficient completeness to allow review of
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those arguments. A portion of the verbatim transcript, a narrative statement
or a bystander's bill of exceptions may be deemed sufficient. In contrast, the
financially able prisoner may purchase the verbatim transcript long before he
frames his arguments. Indeed, before he reveals his contentions he can satisfy
himself that every possible error in prior proceedings can and will be con-
sidered by the reviewing court.
The salutary rule would require that verbatim transcripts be furnished to
all indigent defendants who seek to appeal from or to challenge collaterally
their criminal convictions. This would amount to extending the rule urged
by the concurring Justices in Hardy v. United States' and the dissenters in
Britt v. North Carolina.. to all federal and state cases. The principal argu-
ment raised against such a rule concerns the expense involved. Clearly,
transcribing the reporter's hand-written or machine notes in every criminal
case will be expensive, but the costs should not be overestimated. The law
already requires that some record be kept and made available in readable
form to comply with the present "sufficient completeness" standard." 5 Addi-
tional costs will equal only the difference between the expense of furnishing
verbatim transcripts and that of furnishing records meeting the current test.
Under the proposed rule, transcripts need be furnished only to defendants who
seek to challenge their convictions, and, presumably, many will not wish to
do so. At any rate, most criminal defendants plead guilty; in the overwhelming
majority of cases there is no trial, and transcripts of these pleading proceedings
are brief in comparison to trial transcripts. Proceedings involving post-convic-
tion petitions and motions are also usually not lengthy.
The costs of litigating transcript and other preliminary questions involved
in forma pauperis cases must also be considered. During oral argument in
Hardy v. United States,' the government admitted that in one district re-
quests for transcripts valued at less than $200 are not contested; the litigation
necessary to avoid producing the transcripts is more expensive than production.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has expressed his concern that preparation of tran-
scripts causes delays in the criminal justice system. He believes, however, that
the failure of the system to increase its capacity to produce transcripts is equally
significant.'37 A more demanding rule might prompt an expansion of facilities
". 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
"' 404 U.S. 226 (1971), see discussion note 21 supra.
"'The United States District Court for the District of Kansas provides verbatim transcripts of
criminal trials for use by indigents on direct appeal as a matter of form. A showing of need is required
where transcripts of collateral proceedings are requested. Letter to the writer from Judge George Templar
of the Kansas District Court. February 29, 1972. The present Kansas state practice is governed by KAN.
STAT. ANN. J 22-4509 (Supp. 1971). A showing of need is necessary even on direct appeal. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4505 (Supp. 1971). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 22-4506 (Supp. 1971) and Supreme Court
Rule 121 which govern procedure under KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-1507 (1964), the Kansas statute per-
mitting post-conviction motions to vacate sentence. An indigent petitioner who raises questions which
may appear in the trial record is entitled to any necessary part of the transcript. On appeal from the
denial of a S 1507 motion, the indigent prisoner entitled to proceed in forma pauperis must be furnished
without cost such portions of the transcript of the hearing on the motion as are necessary for appellate
review. Kansas statutes also provide for transcripts to be made of preliminary hearing and arraignment
proceedings. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2904, 3210(5) (Supp. 1971).
"'375 U.S. 277 (1964).
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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and the use of modern equipment in recording and transcription. Long-run
costs would be minimized accordingly. In light of the mass of records now
kept and made available by state and federal govermental bureaucracies, it is
surprising that serious objections to providing free transcripts to indigents are
raised on financial grounds. Surely the protection of an individual's liberty
is more important than most other reasons for keeping expensive records. As
the Chief Justice has noted, "An affluent society ought not be miserly in support
of justice, for economy is not an objective of the system."' 8
The transcript cases present more than a matter of economics. Statutory
rights and constitutional guarantees are involved. At bottom is the question
of the availability to indigents of appellate and collateral review of criminal
convictions. The inescapable conclusion is that a disparity exists between the
language of recent Supreme Court decisions and the actual workings of the
judicial system. Even if a substitute record limited to certain contentions is
sufficient to permit review that is fair and within the bounds of due process,
nothing short of a verbatim transcript will afford review as adequate and
effective as that available to one who can purchase such a transcript. The de-
mands of equal protection have not been met.
LARRY YACKLE
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